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Abstract 
In order to meet the high availability/reliability required 
by the PDS-XADS design, the accelerator needs to 
implement to the maximum possible extent a fault 
tolerance strategy that would allow beam operation in the 
presence of most of the envisaged faults that could occur 
in its beamline components. In this work, we report the 
results of beam dynamics simulations performed to 
characterize the effects of the faults of the main linac 
components (cavities and focusing magnets) on the beam 
parameters. The outcome of this activity is the definition 
of the possible corrective actions that could be conceived 
(and implemented in the system) in order to guarantee the 
fault tolerance characteristics of the accelerator. 
INTRODUCTION 
In current high-power accelerators, when a component 
fails, the beam is immediately shut down, and action is 
then taken to repair the faulty component. After which, 
when the accelerator operation is ready to resume again, 
the procedure followed is quite identical to a new re-start, 
slowly ramping up in beam power. For most accelerators, 
the number of beam interruptions rapidly decreases with 
the trip duration time, thus maintaining an overall good 
level of availability. But for an ADS application, any 
beam trip lasting more than one second will be considered 
as a major accelerator failure, leading to the reactor core 
shutdown. Thus, the philosophy prevailing on current 
machines to cope with component failures should be 
reconsidered, taking into account this requirement. In 
particular, for each failure analysis, the design should 
look at the ability to either maintain the beam under safe 
conditions, or to recover the beam through, in less than 
one second. This is a new feature, not required for any 
other accelerator application, which is quite specific to 
ADS linacs. In this paper, we will develop this fault 
tolerance concept, and try to assess its practical 
implementation through beam dynamics calculations. 
THE PDS-XADS ACCELERATOR 
Consecutive to the work of the European Technical 
Working Group on Accelerator Driven Systems [1], the 
Preliminary Design Study of an eXperimental ADS (PDS-
XADS) was launched in 2001. A large European 
collaboration supported by the EU within the 5th 
Framework Program (FP) performs these studies [2]. Five 
work packages (WP) cover the relevant issues; the WP3 is 
dedicated to the design of the high power proton 
accelerator (HPPA) providing the neutron flux to the sub-
critical reactor via a spallation target. 
The reliability requirement 
The XADS accelerators main specifications are quite 
usual for such an HPPA machine: 600 MeV final energy, 
6 mA CW maximum beam current (10 mA rated), 2% 
beam power stability, 10 % beam size stability on target. 
On the other hand, less than a few (in the order of 5 per 
year) beam stops longer than approximately one second 
are allowed for the successful demonstration of the ADS 
coupling. Given the state-of-the-art in the field of 
accelerator reliability, this requirement appears to be 
highly challenging, and could reveal itself as being a 
"show-stopper" for ADS technology. From this extremely 
high reliability requirement, it is clear that suitable design 
strategies had to be followed early in the conception stage 
of the XADS accelerator. The main guidelines that have 
been highlighted to drive the design are a strong design 
(which makes extensive use of component derating and 
redundancy) and a high degree of fault tolerance (i.e. the 
capability to maintain beam operation within nominal 
conditions under a wide variety of component faults).  
This fault-tolerance concept is a crucial point in the 
design of the XADS accelerator. The state of the art in RF 
system technology is indeed not reliable enough to 
envisage an operation of the XADS accelerator during 
several months without beam trips. We can actually 
foresee at least a few tens of failures per year, only due to 
these systems, based on parts count reliability estimates. 
Therefore, even if a great effort can be surely directed at 
improving the MTBF of RF systems, it seems difficult to 
reach the reliability requirements without implementing 
any fault-tolerance philosophy for the linac design. 
The XADS reference accelerator 
From this, WP3 has assessed the corresponding 
technical answers, and a reference solution based on a 
linear superconducting (SC) accelerator with its 
associated doubly achromatic beam line has been worked 
out up to some detail [3]. The injection section is 
composed of a "classical" proton injector (ECR source + 
normal conducting RFQ structure), followed by additional 
warm IH-DTL or/and superconducting CH-DTL up to a 
transition energy still to be defined (between 5 and 
50 MeV). In this part, fault-tolerance is guaranteed by 
means of a "hot stand-by" spare. Above this transition 
energy, a fully modular SC linac brings the beam up to the 
final energy, using spoke and elliptical cavities. This 
section is designed to be intrinsically fault tolerant, 
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meaning that an individual cavity failure can be handled 
at all stages without loss of the beam. This characteristic 
relies on the use of highly de-rated and independently 
powered accelerating components, associated to a fast 
digital feedback system and adequate diagnostics. 
In the following, the fault-tolerance principle of this 
modular SC linac will be analysed by means of beam 
dynamics simulations. The calculations are performed 
using the TraceWin & Partran codes developed in Saclay 
[4], and on the basis of a 5 MeV - 600 MeV XADS 
reference linac (see Table 1). In all cases, a 10 mA proton 
beam is considered, and the normalized rms emittances 
values at the input are assumed to be 0.27 pi.mm.mrad in 
the transverse planes, and 0.39 pi.mm.mrad in the 
longitudinal plane. Multiparticle calculations are 
performed using at least 10 000 particules with a gaussian 
(truncated at 4σ) phase-space distribution. 
Table 1: Lay-out of the linac used for the simulations; 
focusing is ensured by warm quadrupole doublets. 
SC linac sections Energy range Nb of cavities 
Spoke 2-gap  
352.2 MHz, β=0.15 5  17 MeV 
36 
(2 per lattice) 
Spoke 2-gap  
352.2 MHz, β=0.35 17  91 MeV 
63  
(3 per lattice) 
Elliptical 5-gap 
704.4 MHz, β=0.47 91  192 MeV 
28  
(2 per lattice) 
Elliptical 5-gap 
704.4 MHz, β=0.65 192  498 MeV 
51  
(3 per lattice) 
Elliptical 6-gap 
704.4 MHz, β=0.85 498  615 MeV 
12 
 (4 per lattice) 
TOLERANCE TO A RF CAVITY FAULT 
Consequences of the failure of a RF cavity 
Let us assume in this section that the RF system fails to 
power a cavity somewhere in the superconducting linac, 
and that this cavity is immediately detuned to avoid the 
beam loading effect. This results in a loss of the energy 
gain provided by the failed cavity, and then in a beam 
longitudinal (phase-energy) mismatch at the entrance of 
the following cavity. Because we deal with a non-
relativistic proton beam, this energy loss will imply a 
phase slip along the linac equal to  δφ ≈ 2pi (δz/λ) (δβ/β²), 
increasing with the distance δz from the faulty cavity 
[5]; β is the beam velocity (normalized to c), λ the RF 
wavelength and δβ the velocity loss (compared to the 
reference beam velocity) at δz. 
Of course, the consequences of such a failure strongly 
depend on the position of the cavity in the linac, and on 
its operating conditions. The problem is more serious 
when the velocity of the particle is low, but also when the 
accelerating field and the operating frequency of the 
cavity are high. Another important parameter to be taken 
into account in the analysis is the longitudinal acceptance 
of the linac. The lower is this acceptance (i.e. the higher is 
the synchronous phase compared with the longitudinal 
size of the beam), the faster the fault-induced phase slip 
will off-set the beam towards the phase instability region. 
One way to avoid the problem could thus be to lower both 
the synchronous phase (near the -90° bunching value) and 
the accelerating fields along all the linac, but this would 
lead to an unacceptable increase in length and cost.  
In our XADS reference linac, where conservative but 
realistic synchronous phase and accelerating gradient 
values are used, simulations show that the fault of a cavity 
induces a sufficient phase slip to rapidly drop the beam 
out of the phase stability region. The beam can then not 
be correctly handled longitudinally in the subsequent 
cavities, and it is finally completely lost later in the linac. 
This kind of behaviour with a final 100% beam loss is 
encountered for almost any cavity fault in the linac. 
Retuning using the local compensation method 
From this first analysis, it is clear that in case of a 
cavity failure, some kind of retuning has to be performed. 
The aim of this retuning is to recover the nominal beam 
characteristics at the end of the linac, and in particular its 
energy, while ensuring the same level of beam 
transmission (and of emittance growth) than in the 
reference linac case.  
One simple way to achieve such a retuning is to make a 
local compensation by using the accelerating cavities 
neighbouring the failing one. This method has especially 
the advantage of involving a small number of elements, 
simplifying the retuning procedures and limiting the 
possible induced errors. It is illustrated on Figure 1: if 
cavity #n is faulty, the 4 surrounding cavities (#n-2, #n-1, 
#n+1, #n+2) are retuned to recover the nominal beam 
energy and phase at the end of the following lattice (point 
M). It can of course be done with more cavities if 
necessary. Practically, the retuning of the cavities is made 
only acting on their accelerating field amplitude and/or 
phase. On the transverse beam dynamics side, the 
gradients of the 4 focusing quadrupoles located inside the 
retuned lattices can also be adjustedm if needed. Here 
again, more quadrupoles can be used if necessary. 
 
Figure 1: The local compensation method. 
This retuning has of course to be done properly in order 
to reach a reasonable compromise between the three 
following goals: 1. reach the nominal energy and phase at 
point M, and consequently at the target; 2. limit the 
induced beam mismatch to ensure a 100 % transmission 
and keep the emittance growth as low as possible; 3. 
ensure that we do not exceed a + 30 % accelerating field 
increase in the cavities as compared with their nominal 
derated operation point (i.e. in our case Epk = 33 MV/m 
instead of 25 MV/m in the spoke sections, and Bpk = 
65 mT instead of 50 mT in the elliptical sections). 
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A reasonable compromise between these three 
requirements is not always easy to reach, especially in the 
very low velocity section (spoke β=0.15) where the beam 
is debunching very rapidly at the fault cavity position, 
leading to halo creation and beam losses if a refined 
retuning is not carried out. In this specific case, 
acceptable beam behaviour can be restored (see Figure 2) 
by performing a strong longitudinal focusing in the 
retuned cavities to compensate for this effect. Above 
10 MeV, the situation becomes far easier, and the nominal 
beam specifications can be broadly restored.  
A systematic study of the XADS linac fault-tolerance 
has been performed, optimizing the retuned values to be 
applied for local compensation in the case of the failure of 
most of the linac cavities. Detailed results can be found in 
[6]. The conclusion of the study is that in every case, 
with an appropriate retuning, the beam can be 
transported up to the high energy end without any 
beam loss (100 % transmission, reasonable emittance 
growth), and within the nominal target parameters.  
 
Figure 2: Multiparticle beam envelopes (x-transv., phase) 
in the XADS linac if spoke cavity #4 (5.5 MeV, 3 m) is 
faulty and local compensation is performed. 
CASE OF A QUADRUPOLE FAILURE 
Calculations have been also performed to analyse the 
case where a beam focusing quadrupole is failing. Here 
again, the consequences of such a failure depend on the 
position of the failed quadrupole. The situation is more 
critical in the sections where the safety ratio between the 
beam tube aperture and the beam size is smaller. For 
example, if no retuning at all is performed, the failure of 
one of the very first linac quadrupoles leads to a beam 
loss of about 30 %, while the same failure in the β=0.35 
spoke section only leads to a beam loss of about 10 %. In 
the elliptical sections, the induced beam loss is always 
lower than 5 %. 
Of course, if no retuning is done, the beam is strongly 
mismatched in the transverse planes from the failure 
position up to the linac end. But simulations clearly show 
that the situation can be substantially improved if the 
other quadrupole of the faulty doublet is also switched 
off. As a matter of fact, the induced mismatching is thus 
better balanced between the 2 transverse planes than if 
nothing is done. It is thus recommended to switch off 
the whole doublet if one quadrupole fails. 
Finally, with an adequate retuning of the surrounding 
quadrupole doublets (local compensation method), it is 
generally possible to rematch the beam to the linac and 
obtain beam envelopes very similar to the nominal case 
ones. Detailed results can be found in [6]. 
CONCLUSION 
The systematic analysis performed to evaluate the fault-
tolerance capability of the XADS superconducting linac 
leads to the following conclusions: 
• If a cavity fails and if nothing is done, the beam is 
(almost) always completely lost. 
• If a cavity fails and if an appropriate local 
compensation is done (retuning of a few surronding 
cavities field and phase + adjustement of a few 
quadrupoles gradients if needed), the nominal beam 
parameters at the target can always be restored. 
• If a quadrupole fails, the whole doublet has to be 
switched off to limit the beam losses along the 
accelerator. The nominal beam parameters at the 
target can generally be restored by readjusting a few 
surrounding quadrupole gradients. 
• The situation is substantially more difficult in the 
very low energy section of the linac (< 10 MeV). 
This analysis is anyway not complete because it only 
takes into account the beam behavior before the failure, 
and after local compensation. The remaining part of the 
problem consists now in analysing what happens during 
the transient state, and in optimizing the way the retuning 
procedure is carried out in order to minimize the possible 
beam losses due to these transients. This full analysis will 
be performed within the 6th FP project EUROTRANS, 
with the development of adequate simulation codes, and 
the construction of a real accelerating cryomodule, 
equipped with its associated RF control systems, to 
demonstrate the proof of principle of the technology [7]. 
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